Title Details: | |
Negative freedom, its negatives, and John Stuart Mill |
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Authors: |
Kioupkiolis, Alexandros |
Reviewer: |
Sevastakis, Nikolaos |
Description: | |
Abstract: |
This section examines liberal approaches that prioritize negative freedom — that is, the absence of social interference in the individual's actions at will (A. Berlin). These approaches partially detach freedom from specific conceptions of well-being and other fixed frameworks. However, they do not address the constraints of internalized social prejudices and the subject’s psychological attachments, as they disregard the formation of the self and overlook the need for reflective engagement with one's own identity. At the same time, they disconnect individual freedom from political autonomy. The progressive liberalism of J.S. Mill does not exhibit the same shortcomings. Yet, insofar as it ties individual freedom to the cultivation of a particular set of capacities, inclinations, and desires, it falls short of advancing the idea of freedom as an open-ended identity and life plan without pre-established boundaries.
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Type: |
Chapter |
Creation Date: | 2015 |
Item Details: | |
License: |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/gr |
Handle | http://hdl.handle.net/11419/4813 |
Bibliographic Reference: | Kioupkiolis, A. (2015). Negative freedom, its negatives, and John Stuart Mill [Chapter]. In Kioupkiolis, A. 2015. Philosophies of freedom [Undergraduate textbook]. Kallipos, Open Academic Editions. https://hdl.handle.net/11419/4813 |
Language: |
Greek |
Is Part of: |
Philosophies of freedom |
Publication Origin: |
Kallipos, Open Academic Editions |