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| Title Details: | |
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The philosophy of values in Hume: being-benefit and moral emotions |
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| Authors: |
Theodorou, Panagiotis |
| Reviewer: |
Dimitriou, Stefanos |
| Description: | |
| Abstract: |
Hume maturely summarizes the early dialogue of modern philosophy (Cartesian and Locke) around the issues in which we accept that emotions ("passions") and values are involved. Hume delves into the realm of thymic phenomena and attempts a radical repositioning of the relationship between reason and "passions" in matters of human agency. The subtle distinctions he identifies in the thymic realm and the close connections between thymic phenomena and human ethics and values such as utility and justice make him a major figure within the history of the philosophy of action and, implicitly, of aesthetics. He is the philosopher who in many ways inspired Kant in his magnificent synthesis of critical philosophy, an important moment in which he paved the way for the modern discussion of values. More specifically, in the context that most concerns us here, Hume poses the problem of the relationship between being and ought.
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| Type: |
Chapter |
| Creation Date: | 2015 |
| Item Details: | |
| License: |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/gr |
| Handle | http://hdl.handle.net/11419/2635 |
| Bibliographic Reference: | Theodorou, P. (2015). The philosophy of values in Hume: being-benefit and moral emotions [Chapter]. In Theodorou, P. 2015. Introduction to the Philosophy of Values [Undergraduate textbook]. Kallipos, Open Academic Editions. https://hdl.handle.net/11419/2635 |
| Language: |
Greek |
| Is Part of: |
Introduction to the Philosophy of Values |
| Publication Origin: |
Kallipos, Open Academic Editions |